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Critical Vendors: Line Breakers Par
Excellence
Samuel W. Calhoun*
I first heard the term "critical vendor" when I was asked to comment on
Travis Turner's Note. Consequently, my perspective on the issues raised by
critical vendor orders is definitely that of a non-specialist. While my comments
therefore may be of limited usefulness to the bankruptcy expert, my hope is that
non-specialist readers will benefit-as I describe my own path in trying to
understand this subject, perhaps they will be helped in understanding it too.
For reasons that will become clear, I begin by revealing my perspective on
the judicial function. I believe in judicial restraint. My allegiance to this
principle is premised in my political philosophy. I believe that the people
should govern themselves through their elected representatives. As a general
rule, judges should implement a statute as it is written by the lawmakers, even
if the judge thinks that the statute is a bad idea. A judge should not, in
derogation of statutory language, impose a result that the particular judge thinks
is wiser. But why is this so bad? Might not the judge's outcome in fact be
wiser? Perhaps, but any improved result would come at too high a costerosion of the principle of self-government. Individual judges, or small groups
of judges, many of whom are unelected and some of whom serve for life,
should not usurp the authority of the people to govern themselves.
Having supplied this necessary background, I will now begin to trace my
progress in coming to grips with Turner's topic. First, congratulations to
Turner on his Note. It is comprehensive, clearly written, and insightful. I
could not have asked for a better guide into this interesting controversy. But
why call it interesting? Is this not a technical, dull topic, with no possible
appeal except to the bankruptcy expert? I disagree. Perhaps the subject's chief
interest to the non-specialist is captured by the imagery used by another writer
on the subject:
The hot, harsh sun beats down on the hundreds, perhaps thousands,
waiting in the line snaked around a solitary well. Those who are fortunate
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will receive a cupful or two of relief; others will get nothing. Suddenly, a
small group of figures push their way to the front.
"We'll each take a gallon," their leader says.
"But that's not fair. There's only so much to go around," the well
keeper replies.
"We don't care. We're critical vendors."'
This story grips our imagination. It summons up many past experiences.
Every reader has encountered that particular subclass of humanity known as
the line breakers. From our childhoods, we have all viewed those who break
in line as disreputable characters. Critical vendors therefore automatically
carry the stigma of immoral behavior. And their method of breaking in line
adds to their shame. Critical vendors are bullies. As Turner puts it, they
"threaten to disrupt the debtor's reorganization by withholding critical goods
and services until paid their pre-petition debts." 2 Other commentators have
used the terms "'economic blackmail' 3 and "holdup power, 4 to describe the
strong-armed tactics of critical vendors.
This is powerful language. Its use makes the ordinary person
instinctively want to see critical vendors stopped, in the same way that as kids
we were happy when some stem teacher or principal yanked a line breaker
back to his or her proper place in the line. But now another fascinating
element of the topic surfaces: Many of the judges whom we would expect to
curtail critical vendors have instead authorized payments to them. While
these judges no doubt believe that they are doing the right thing-ensuring
"the continued survival and successful reorganization of the firm" 5 -they
have been subjected to harsh criticism. They have been accused of acting
illegally. The charge is that without any authority in the Bankruptcy Code,
they have violated one of the Code's fundamental canons: "thou shall treat
all similarly situate creditors equally." 6 These judges have also been accused
1. Joseph Gilday, "Critical" Error: Why Essential Vendor Payments Violate the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 411, 413 (2003).
2. Travis N. Turner, Note, Kmart and Beyond: A "Critical"Look at Critical Vendor
Ordersand the Doctrineof Necessity, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 431,434 (2006).
3. Gilday, supra note 1, at 414.
4. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTcY 191 (3d ed. 2001).
5. Joshua A. Ehrenfeld, Comment, Quieting the Rebellion: Eliminating Payment of
Prepetition Debts Priorto Chapter)) Reorganizations,70 U. Cmi. L. REv. 621, 626 (2003).
6. Gilday, supra note 1, at 414. Critical vendor payments allow preferred creditors to be
paid ahead of other claimants with the same-or higher-priority. See Turner, supranote 2, at
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of "rebellion."7 Despite federal circuit court decisions determining that critical
vendor payments are contrary
to the Code, some lower courts have continued to
8
approve them anyway.
It can thus readily be seen that Turner's subject is a veritable cornucopia
of fascinating themes, mixing basic moral indignation toward bullies with
alleged judicial lawlessness and insurrection. It would be difficult to find a
legal topic more interesting than this!
However, interesting as the subject may be, a reader's chief concern is
whether I can offer any useful insights. My initial thought as I began to read
Turner's Note was to wonder how critical vendors could be brazen enough
even to try recovering their pre-petition debts in the way he describes:
"threaten[ing] to disrupt the reorganization by withholding critical goods and
services [unless paid]." 9 I do remember a little from teaching individual
bankruptcy a few years ago. One key bankruptcy concept is the automatic stay.
Under Bankruptcy Code § 362, the filing of a bankruptcy petition brings to a
screeching halt all efforts to collect pre-petition claims. Subsection (a)(6) has
the broadest wording: it prohibits "any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim
against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case."10 The
phrase "any act" is obviously very expansive. Would it not clearly bar a threat
by critical vendors to disrupt the reorganization unless paid? Outright threats
would be barred," but critical vendors are too savvy to be so plain-spoken.
According to David Schilli, a bankruptcy practitioner, a conversation between a
critical vendor and the bankrupt might go something like this: Critical Vendor:
"I can't supply you any further trade credit.
I'm overextended." Bankrupt: "Is
'2
there something I can do to help you?'
436-37 (laying out this very problem). Such payments simultaneously violate another
central tenet[] of bankruptcy--the absolute priority rule ... [which] requires that
before junior claimants can receive anything in a bankruptcy reorganization,
claimants having priority must be paid in full or agree to other treatment....
Critical vendor orders violate the absolute priority rule by paying certain unsecured
creditors ahead of claimants having higher priority claims.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
7. Ehrenfeld, supra note 5, at 622.
8. See id. (noting that the acquiescence of lower courts allows the "rebellion" to quietly
continue).
9. Turner, supra note 2, at 434.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (2001).
11. See In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 86 B.R. 922, 932 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988)
(noting that threats or coercion by upset creditors should not be tolerated).
12. Telephone Interview with Dave Schilli, Partner, Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A.,
Charlotte, N.C. (Aug. 26, 2005).
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This, of course, is a coded conversation by which the vendor says no
additional trade credit will be extended unless the pre-petition debt is paid.
Does this violate the stay? One commentator points out that "[a]lthough the
Bankruptcy Code prohibits [creditors] from acting to collect on previous debts,
nothing requires them to continue shipping supplies to a [debtor] that owes
them money."13 This is accurate, but the critical vendor does more than simply
cease to deal with the debtor. The vendor implicitly threatens to cease dealing
with the debtor unless paid the pre-petition claim. To me, this is a clear
violation of the stay.
How, then, were critical vendor payments ever allowed by the courts? If
Congress had intended to permit such payments, one would have expected to
find critical vendor payments listed in § 362(b), which enumerates numerous
exceptions to the automatic stay. 14 But critical vendor payments are not there.
Consequently, as Turner points out, the courts have looked to the common law
and to numerous other provisions of the Code for purported authority to allow
critical vendor payments. 15 Turner rejects all but one of these options as
illusory sources of authority for critical vendor payments. 16 The basic flaw in
these various authorization arguments is that § 507 of the Bankruptcy Code
explicitly sets out those claims that Congress has determined are to be given
priority. 17 Critical vendors are not on the list. Thus, pushing them to the front
of the line via some alternative route subverts the express intent of Congress as
to the order in which claims are to be paid. Plus, it gives critical vendors their
money months before
§ 507 priority claimants are typically paid, assuming that
18
they are paid at all.
The one provision that Turner believes may provide statutory authority for
critical vendor payments is § 363(b), which allows the debtor-in-possession,
after notice and hearing, to use property of the estate outside of the ordinary

13. Ehrenfeld, supra note 5, at 621.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(l)-(b)(18) (2001).
15. Turner, supra note 2, at 443-58.
16. Id. at 458.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2001).
18. Priority claims typically are paid pursuant to the confirmed Chapter 11 plan, and
confirmation can take months. See Gilday, supra note 1, at 414 ("[C]ritical vendors blessed by
the court receive some, and sometimes all, money due them at the beginning of the case, despite
their unsecured status."); see also Anthony Michael Sabino, The Death of Critical Vendor
Motions and the PotentialDemise of the Doctrineof Necessity: Farewellto Two Misbegotten
Doctrines, 6 TRANSACTIONS 47, 47 (2004) (describing how critical vendor motions disregard
statutory practices). Moreover, having priority does not guarantee that any payment will be
forthcoming. There simply may not be enough money for payments to be made.
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course of business.' 9 Turner cites, for example, Professor Douglas Baird's
argument that ajudge who permits a critical vendor payment under § 363(b) is
not actually allowing the debtor to honor a pre-petition debt. 20 Instead, the
debtor is being allowed to strike
"an unusual bargain by which it is getting post21
petition goods and services.",
The language of § 363(b), standing alone, may indeed be reasonably
susceptible to Professor Baird's interpretation, but ultimately his argument is
not convincing. Everyone knows that the debtor permitted to pay a critical
vendor under § 363(b) is in fact being allowed to pay a pre-petition debt. This
would be unobjectionable if § 363(b) actually signifies congressional openness
to such payments.2 2 When, however, the Bankruptcy Code is considered more
broadly, the inescapable conclusion is that this use of § 363(b) frustrates the
priority system established by Congress. First, as previously noted, critical
vendors are not mentioned in either the exceptions to the automatic stay 23 or in
the list of priority claimants. 24 Second, Congress declined the opportunity to
extend the necessity of payment rule, one of the common law doctrines relied
upon to justify critical vendor payments,25 beyond "the narrow category of
cases involving railroad reorganizations." 26 Third, § 362(d) of the present Code
allows a court to grant relief from the automatic stay provisions directed to acts
against property if the creditor shows that the debtor has no equity in the
27
property and the "property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.,
This provision shows that Congress, when it wants to, can craft language
requiring that estate property be dealt with in a manner deemed necessary to a
successful reorganization. Critical vendor payments are defended as necessary

19. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2001); see Turner, supra note 2, at 450-57 (discussing the
possibility that § 363(b) authorizes critical vendor orders).
20. Turner, supra note 2, at 454 (citing Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter11,
12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69,97 (2004)).
21. Id. at 455.
22. Judge Easterbrook, in speculating (without finally deciding the question) that
§ 363(b)(1) might be read to authorize critical vendor payments, stated that this result would not
impair congressional authority to establish priorities if the section in fact supports such judicial
leeway: "If the [statutory] language is too open-ended, that is a problem for the legislature." In
re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 495 (2004).
23. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (stating that the Bankruptcy Code does
not mention critical vendor payments in the enumerated exceptions).
24. See supranotes 17-18 and accompanying text (mentioning that the Bankruptcy Code
nowhere gives critical vendors priority over other claimants).
25. Turner, supra note 2, at 443-47.
26. Ehrenfeld, supra note 5, at 627.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B) (2001).
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for effective reorganizations, 28 but Congress has not seen fit to recognize them
in the Code.
Perhaps the strongest argument showing that critical vendor payments
frustrate congressional intent is premised in changes made by the new
Bankruptcy Code, which became effective on October 17, 2005. The new
Code contains two provisions showing that Congress knows how to give
special treatment to pre-petition trade creditors when it desires to do so. New
§ 546(c) strengthens the reclamation rights of those who have sold goods to the
debtor shortly before bankruptcy. 29 To further protect these trade creditors,
§ 503(b)(9) creates a new priority administrative expense for the value of any
goods received by the debtor within twenty days before the commencement of
the case. 30
These provisions indicate that Congress has given these pre-petition
creditors all the protection it wants to provide. If a court grants further special
treatment under the critical vendor rubric, the result is a direct conflict with
congressional intent. Consider, for example, a trade creditor who supplied
goods within twenty days of the petition, but for some reason has been unable
to reclaim the goods. In the new Code, Congress grants this creditor an
administrative priority for the value of those goods, but the claim will be paid
pursuant to the confirmed plan, which means that payment could be delayed for
months after filing.3 ' Moreover, there is no guarantee that the claim will
actually be paid. 32 Some debtors will be administratively insolvent, that is,
unable to pay all administrative expenses.33 Now consider the vast difference
in outcome if this same trade creditor is designated a critical vendor. This
exalted status is the gold standard of preferential treatment, as the result is often
immediate payment in full. Moreover, the amount presumably would not be
restricted to the value of goods supplied within the twenty-day period.

28. See supra text accompanying note 5 (expressing a defense put forth in favor of critical
vendor payments).
29. 11 U.S.C.A. § 546(c)(1) (Special Ed. 2005). One improvement is that the new power
to reclaim goods is expressly granted by federal law, unlike the existing reclamation right, 11
U.S.C. § 546(c)(1) (2001), which depends upon incorporating state statutory or common law
reclamation rights. Id.
30. 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(b)(9) (Special Ed. 2005).
31. See supra note 18 (explaining how long it currently takes for priority claimants to
receive payments).
32. Id.
33. It is not uncommon for professional fees to exhaust available funds, leaving nothing
for other administrative priority claimants. Telephone Interview with David Schilli, supranote
12.
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To me, it is plain that critical vendor payments violate congressional
intent. Thus, even if critical vendor payments are in some circumstances
thought to be desirable as a matter of public policy, a judge should not approve
them via jury-rigged claims of authority premised in a hodgepodge of
inapplicable provisions. To do so is to substitute one judge's opinion for the
will of our elected representatives. This violates fundamental principles of
democratic government.
If, however, Congress can be convinced that critical vendor payments are
sometimes a good thing, presumably it will amend the Bankruptcy Code
expressly to authorize them. Once clear statutory authority is provided,
Turner's heightened evidentiary standard for identifying the situations in which
critical vendor payments should be made is worthy of serious consideration.
His goal is to "require the debtor to prove and quantify the [payments']
supposed benefit to the debtor's estate in an effort to protect the other
unsecured creditors."34 This is a desirable objective, but my former colleague,
Joe Ulrich, has suggested an alternative way to achieve it. 35 Why leave it up to
the court to make such a complicated evidentiary finding? Why not say instead
that no critical vendor payments will be approved unless creditors holding twothirds of the remaining unsecured claims vote to approve the payments? After
all, if the reorganization eventually fails, it is their money that would have been
spent to pay the critical vendors. Since they bear the risk, are they not in the
best position
to decide if paying off critical vendors will ultimately create a
36
larger pie?

34. Turner, supra note 2, at 459.
35. Telephone Interview with Joe Ulich, Professor of Law, Emeritus, Washington and
Lee University School of Law (Aug. 2005).
36. To use imagery from our grammar school experiences with line breakers, Professor
Ulrich's proposal would allow miscreants to keep their ill-gotten place in line only if those
shoved aside vote to allow it. Displaced unsecured creditors presumably would give their
approval only when critical vendor payments were believed to be beneficial not just to the
preferred recipients, but to all those affected by the payments.
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